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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MILDRED RHOADES individually and as ) 
Administratrix of the Estate of Claude 
Rhoades, deceased, ) 
Plaintiff - Appellant ) Case No. 14159 
' v . • • • ) ' 
JAMES C. WRIGHT, also known as JAMES ) 
CLIFFORD WRIGHT, and CLIFFORD WRIGHT 
and ESSIE WRIGHT, his wife, ) 
Defendants - Respondents. ) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover for the wrongful death 
of Claude Rhoades. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge Edward Sheya dismissed plaintiff's complaint 
holding that the Court had neither in rem jurisdiction by 
virtue of the attachment statute nor in personam by virtue 
of the Utah Long Arm Statute. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the dismissal granted 
below. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants object to plaintiff's statement of the 
facts as reciting information not introduced into evidence. 
The sole evidence in this case consists of the affidavits 
of defendants stating generally the location and date of 
the occurrence and the residence of the parties. The alleged 
ownership of the land, the transfer of ownership from one 
party to another, the property settlement agreement of James 
Wright's cousin, and the basic facts leading up to the shoot-
ing are substantially in dispute and no depositions or affida-
vits are on file in this case supporting the statement of 
facts given by plaintiffs. The statement that Mr. James Wright 
was found guilty of first degree murder in Colorado and was 
sentenced to life imprisonment is so clearly irrelavent that 
it must be considered only as having been given for prejudicial 
value. In fact, that conviction was reversed and Mr. Wright 
was found innocent during later judicial proceedings and re-
leased -- all of this information is well known to plaintiff. 
Defendants basically agree with plaintiff's statement 
of the legal proceedings in the Utah Federal District Court 
and in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeal, with this addition! 
after the dismissal in the Federal District Court, plaintiff 
refiled the identical action in San Juan County, Utah. Defend-
ants were served in Colorado, and appeared specially in this 
case by filing a motion to quash service of process on the 
basis that the prior decision in the federal case constituted 
-2-
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res judicata, or, in the alternative, the Court had neither in 
rem nor in personam jurisdiction over defendants in any event. 
The court sustained defendants position regarding jurisdiction; 
it never specifically reached the question of res judicata. 
ISSUES 
1. The prior decision in this case in the Federal 
Court is res judicata as to jurisdiction. 
2. If res judicata doesn't apply, the Court has 
neither personal nor in rem jurisdiction in any event. 
3. The Utah Attachment Statute is unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PRIOR DECISION IN THIS CASE IN THE FEDERAL COURT IS RES 
JUDICATA AS TO JURISDICTION. 
As noted in the statement of facts, the identical 
case was originally brought in the Federal District Court for 
Utah and there dismissed for lack of personal and in rem juris-
diction. A copy of that Complaint is contained in the record 
on page 38 together with the decision of the 10th Circuit 
located at page 43. The parties and the relief sought are 
identical in both actions. 
A general statement of the doctrine of res judicata 
is as follows: 
A final judgment on the merits, rendered 
-3-
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by a Court of competent jurisdiction, is con-
clusive as to the rights of the parties and 
their privies, and as to them constitutes an 
. absolute bar to a subsequent action involving 
the same claim, demand, and cause of action, 
whether the plaintiff failed to recover in the 
first action, or is successful in recovering 
a part of his claim. The judgment puts an end 
to the cause of action, which cause cannot again 
be brought into litigation between the parties 
upon any ground, or for any purpose whatever, 
in the absence of some factor invalidating the 
judgment, 46 Am, Jur. 2d Judgments, Sec. 404 
(1969). ; 
The doctrine of res judicata also applies to question 
involving jurisdiction. 
The principles of res judicata apply to 
questions of jurisdiction, whether it be 
jurisdiction of the subject matter or of the 
parties. This rule is not less applicable to 
a decision denying jurisdiction than to one 
sustaining it. Consequently, it has been 
generally held that a judgment for the defend-
ant based on lack of jurisdiction is a con-
clusive adjudication of questions material to 
the Court's jurisdiction and actually decided 
by the judgment. Annot., 49 ALR 2d 1036, 1052 
(1956). 
The view enunciated above is supported by Utah law. 
In Brandon v. Teague, 5 U.2d 214, 299 P2d 113 (1956) the 
Court broadly held in successive state court cases that the 
principles of res judicata apply to jurisdiction. The same 
ruling was applied where the original case had been brought 
and dismissed in the federal court and later refiled in the 
Utah State Court. In sustaining a motion to dismiss on the 
basis that the original decision of the federal court on juris 
diction was res judicata, the court said: 
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In the instant case, the conclusion that 
the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction was 
necessarily based upon a determination of the 
critical issue, i.e., that the individual de-
fendants were not personally responsible under 
the contract....the issue having been squarely 
presented and determined, it is res judicata as 
between these parties. McCarthy v. State, 1 U.2d 
205, 265 P.2d 385, 389 (1953). 
The factual background involving each of these cases 
and more extensive quotations therefrom are found in the record 
on pages 16-19. Considering these cases, the decision of 
the Federal Court dismissing the cause of action on the basis 
of jurisdiction is res judicata as to the instant case since 
the parties and the causes of action are identical. Plaintiff 
does not really contest this argument, but she does assert 
however, that Rule 64C(a) URCP was amended and that this amend-
ment restricts the scope of res judicata. Plaintiff has 
cited cases in support of this argument, but those cases rep-
resent only one side of a split of authority on the question 
of whether a subsequent change in the law precludes in appli-
cation of res judicata in a later case. The following cases 
have held that a change in the law does not preclude the appli-
cation of res judicata. In Young v O'Keefe, 248 Iowa 751, 
82N.W.2d 111 (1957), plaintiff sued to obtain certain retire-
ment benefits provided under a pension plan. The court held 
that plaintiff did not qualify and the suit was dismissed. 
After the initial trial, the statute was amended to allow 
Plaintiff to qualify as a recipient. On the basis of this 
- =;-
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change plaintiff again brought the same action for benefits. 
Defendant raised the defense of res judicata which was sus-
tained by the Court as follows: 
The case is further complicated by the 
fact that there was a former decision. The 
spectre of res judicata arises to haunt plain-
tiff. The record conclusively establishes that 
his case was already adjudicated when the statu-
tory change occurred. He seeks here to establish 
the same status he sought before, by the same 
evidence. 
The basis of the doctrine of res judicata 
is usually said to be the necessity of a 
finality of judicial decision. There is no 
doubt of its presence here. 
• • . • • • • 
. . • • . ' . • ' • , * • ' .-
If the purpose of res judicata be to add 
• finality to judicial decisions, the propriety of 
its presence here cannot be doubted. A judg-
ment based on plain statutory construction, 
as was our earlier decision, would not be exactly 
final if the legislature could by subsequent 
retroactive change of the statute reopen the 
identical controversy for the benefit of a losing 
litigant. Young v. O'Keefe, supra, at 114-115. 
In a second case, LaBarbera v. Batsch, 10 Ohio 
St.2d 106, 227 N.E. 2d55 (1967), plaintiff brought suit to 
recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile 
accident. The case was dismissed since the statute of limi-
tations had run. Thereafter, the law concerning the statute 
of limitations was changed. Plaintiff again sued and defend-
ant moved for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. 
The court dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata 
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stating as follows: 
Such a result [as urged by plaintiff] would 
be directly contrary to the policy of res 
judicata and of statutes o£ limitation. The 
policy basis of res judicata is to assure an 
end to litigation, and to prevent a party from 
being vexed twice for the same cause . . . . 
Once a matter has been finally determined in 
favor of a party and is no longer subject to 
appeal, he has a right to rely on the stability 
and finality of such determination . . . . The 
strength of this policy is the reason courts 
refuse to adopt the one of two possible con-
structions which is not consistent with such 
policy . . , and to refuse to allow even a 
retroactive statute to abrogate the res 
judicata effect of an existing and valid final 
judgment, in the absence of a clear legislative 
intent to do so. LaBarbera v. Eatsch, supra, 
at 62. 
Although a split of authority does exist on the 
question of whether changes in the law take a prior determina-
tion beyond the scope of res judicata, no question exists 
that res judicata applies to all issues which were in fact 
raised and those which could have been raised in a prior 
proceeding. As stated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp. 347 
U.S.89 (1954) at pp. 90-91, 
We have often held that under the doctrine 
of res judicata a judgment entered in an action 
conclusively settles that action as to all matters 
that were or might have been litigated or adjudged 
therein. 
See also 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Sec. 417 (1969); Burns 
v. Kepler, 147 Colo. 153, 362 P.2d 1037, 1039 (1961). 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken the same position. 
-7-
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In Richards v. Hodson, 26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044, (1971), 
the Court stated: 
Strictly speaking, the term t?res judicata11 
applies to a judgment between the same parties 
who in a prior action litigated the identical 
questions which are present in the latter case. 
Not only are the parties bound by the ruling on 
matters actually litigated, but are also pre-
vented from raising issues which should have been 
raised in the former action. The rule of law 
is wise in that it gives finality to judgments 
and also conserves the time of courts, in that 
courts should not be required to relitigate 
matters which have once been fully and finally 
•  * litigated. 
Two further Utah cases are of significance in this 
regard. The first Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 
(Utah 1974), plaintiffs, a group of Texaco lessee dealers, 
sued defendant initially in federal court for damages under 
the ^ Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act. That case was 
eventually dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. Plaintiffs 
then refiled in state court under the Utah Unfair Practices 
Act. Defendant obtained a summary judgment arguing that this 
was a theory plaintiffs could have used in the prior case 
and were now precluded from doing so under the doctrine of 
res judicata. In sustaining this decision the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
In Wheaton v. Pearson, this court stated 
• that the doctrine of res judicata applied not 
only to points and issues which were actually 
raised and decided in a prior action but also 
as to those that could have been adjudicated, 
with the qualification that the claim, demand, 
or cause be the same in both cases. If the 
parties have had an opportunity to present 
their case and judgment is rendered thereon, 
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it is binding both on those issues that were 
tried and those that were triable in that pro-
ceeding, and they are precluded from further 
litigating the matter. 
Since plaintiffs failed to assert their 
state claim when the Federal court had the 
power to adjudicate it with their federal claim, 
they are barred under the doctrine of res 
judicata from litigating these issues in the 
instant action. Be11iston y. Texaco, Inc. 
supra, at 380. 
In the second case, which is referred to in 
Belliston, Wheaton v. Pearson, 14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d S46 
(1962), plaintiffs brought an action initially to establish 
a right-of-way over adjoining property owned by defendants 
on a theory of prescriptive easement. In that original 
case the defendants obtained a summary judgment. Plaintiffs 
thereafter filed a new action under a theory of implied 
easement; the complaint was dismissed on the basis of res 
judicata. Again in affirming this dismissal the Supreme 
Court held: 
Here, we have the same parties litigating 
the same subject matter - an asserted right-of-
way over defendants property. While plaintiffs 
endeavored to establish their right-of-way 
by prescriptive easement in the first action, 
the issue or theory of implied easement, now 
urged in the second action, could have been 
urged and adjudicated in the first action . . . . 
Policy would seem to indicate that when a 
plaintiff has once attempted to obtain his entire 
relief, based upon his entire claim, then the 
matter should be laid at rest. Wheaton v. 
Pearson, Supra at 947-48. 
In the instant case, the attachment statute was 
-9-
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modified on November 1, 1972, before briefs w6re filed on 
appeal with the 10th Circuit in the former federal case. 
Defendants did not file their original brief with the 10th 
Circujit until January, 1973 and the matter was not argued 
before the 10th Circuit until May, 1973. The decision was 
rendered on July 23, 1973 which was followed by a petition 
for rehearing, which was denied. On August 21, 1973 a mandate 
issued out of the Appellate Court and an Order of Dismissal 
without prejudice was entered in the Federal District Court on 
September 19, 1973 dismissing plaintiffs complaint. Plain-
tiff therefore had approximately ten months within which to 
bring this modification to the attention of the federal court. 
At no time was the change in statute brought to the attention 
of the court and was a matter which the court clearly could 
have considered. Under the principals laid down in Wheaton 
and Belliston, the dismissal by the federal court is res 
judicata on this case. 
;v POINT II 
IF RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY, THE COURT HAS NEITHER 
PERSONAL NOR IN REM JURISDICTION. 
A. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction. The 
plaintiff conceeds on page 17 of her brief that she claims 
nothing by way of personal jurisdiction over the defendants 
under the Utah Long Arm Statute. In view of this concession, 
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defendants will restrict themselves to a consideration o£ 
those issues raised by plaintiffs alleged in rem jurisdic-
tion under the attachment statute. 
B. The Court lacks in rem jurisdiction. As noted 
in the statement of facts, all the events which gave rise to 
this cause of action occurred in Colorado. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff claims that the estate o£ Claude Rhoades suffered 
some undefined loss in the State of Utah and this economic 
loss has jurisdictional significance as far as the attach-
ment statute is concerned. The question^ therefore, is 
whether the Utah Attachment Statute is designed as a vehicle 
for imposing in rem jurisdiction in a wrongful death case 
where the sole contact with Utah is some economic loss to 
the estate of the decedant. Very little direct law exists 
on this point. The case of Alpers v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 
4G3 Pa. 626, 170 A.2d 360 (1961), is directly in point, how-
ever. In Alpers, plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, was 
injured in New Jersey in an automobile accident allegedly 
caused by a truck owned by defendant and driven by one of its 
employees. Plaintiff attached property of defendant in Penn-
sylvania and brought an action for damages. Defendant appear-
ed specially for purposes of contesting jurisdiction, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling 
dismissing the Writ of Attachment, stating as follows: 
The Court below very properly held that 
a Writ for an Attachment in an action ex delicto 
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will not lie for torts committed outside the 
Commonwealths boundaries. Alpers v. New Jersey 
Bell Tel. Co., Supra, at 262. 
For another case to the same effect, see Wood v. Virginia 
Hot Springs Co., 202 Pa. 40, 551 Atl. 586 (1902). 
Plaintiff has gone to some lengths in her brief to 
distinguish Alpers on the basis of a modification Of the 
Pennsylvania Attachment Statute. The modification did 
occur, but this, of course, does not debilitate the holding 
of the Alpers case which is singular in its impact in the 
instant case. More importantly, plaintiff cites no other 
cases in her favor where attachment statutes have been 
used as a vehicle for imposing in rem jurisdiction in a 
wrongful death case where the sole contact with the foreign 
state is economic injury to the estate of the deceased. In 
this regard plaintiff has clearly failed in her burden of 
proof. 
The decision in Alpers finds ian analogue in cases 
where plaintiffs have attempted personal jurisdiction under 
long arm statutes where a tort arose outside the state, but 
plaintiff suffered economic loss in the state. The courts 
have rejected such attempts on grounds of due process. One 
such case was Hydroswift Corp. v LouieTs Boats and Motors, 
27 U.2d 233, 494 P.2d 532 (1972). In that case, plaintiff, 
a Utah corporation, delivered boats to defendant, a foreign 
corporation in Oregon, where defendant allegedly converted 
_ i n _ 
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them. Plaintiff brought suit in Utah for conversion, al-
leging that, although the tort had been committed in 
Oregon, plaintiff had suffered economic injury in Utah suf-
ficient to satisfy the requirements of the Long Arm Statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a lower Court*s decision 
quashing service of process stating: 
* Plaintiff concedes that the conversion . . . 
was committed in Oregon, but says it resulted 
in damage to plaintiff in Utah, i.e., non-
payment of the purchase price. Plaintiff cites 
numerous authorities reflecting the liberal 
expansion of the Conflict of laws concept since 
Pennoyer v. Neff and suggests that they even 
transcend the "minimum contact" principle enunci-
ated in International Shoe v. Washington. We 
disagree with the urgence of plaintiff, are un-
willing to extend that case, which appears to 
have inspired our Long Arm Statute, and believe 
and hold that under the circumstances related 
hereinabove, that plaintiff ligitimately cannot 
claim jurisdiction that might sanction this 
litigation in Utah. 
Under 78-27-22, it is stated that the pro-
visions of the Act apply "to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the 14th 
Amendmend. . . . 
We believe that the same amendment would 
protect one from being subject to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state, where he allegedly 
committed a tort such as claimed here, or a slander 
or the like in a sister state, but ndt in Utah, on 
grounds of denial of due process of law. 
• The Court therefore held that economic injury 
to a resident of Utah was insufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion under the Long Arm Statute where a tort arose outside 
the State. This same holding is reflected in the decisions 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from other jurisdictions: Crimi v. Elliot Bros. Trucking 
Co,, 279 F. Supp. 555 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); Jenrette v. Seaboard 
Coastline Railroad Co., 308 F. Supp. 642 (D. S.C. 1969); 
Friedrick R. Zoellner Corp. v. Texas Metals Co., 396 F.2d 
300 (2d Cir. 1968). 
The analogue referred to above was persuasive both 
on the 10th Circuit Court and on Judge Sheya. In its de-
cision the 10th Circuit held that the attachment statute 
couldn't be used as a vehicle to impose in rem jurisdiction 
for the same reasons the Long Arm Statute couldn't be used 
to impose in personam jurisdiction. Judge Sheya largely 
concurred, stating the attachment statute couldn't be used 
to impose in rem jurisdiction in a wrongful death case where 
the tort sued upon arose in Colorado. (R.62-63). 
The decision in Hydroswift and its related cases, 
together with the decision in Alpers, reflects a general 
concern that a state should protect its citizens only for 
torts or substantial injuries actually committed within the 
state. Fictional, illusory or insubstantial injuries should 
not be used as vehicles to impose jurisdiction. These cases 
also square in with the basic policy behind the Attachment 
Statute. Clearly, one of the purposes of the act is to pro* 
vide residents of the state with an effective means of re-
dress for wrongs committed by non-residents. The procedure 
allows residents to bring the action in a local state court 
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thereby inducing a non-resident defendant to appear and de-
fend. This, of course, reduces the expenses of litigation 
as far as the plaintiff is concerned because he need not 
travel out of state to find the non-resident defendant. The 
state therefore has a legitimate interest in protecting its 
citizens against wrongs committed against them by non-residents 
in the state. Where the situation is otherwise, as it is in 
this case, where Mr. and Mrs. Rhoades left the state and 
were injured using facilities and services provided in Colorado, 
it would then seem that the injured party should prosecute 
their action for alleged injuries in the state of the occur-
rence. No obvious state purpose is realized by allowing in 
rem jurisdiction in Utah. 
The question of in rem jurisdiction has particular 
significance to defendant James C. Wright. The statement 
of facts indicates that he is presently not a title owner 
of any part of the attached property in Utah. If jurisdic-
tion is to be acquired by virtue of the attachment, it would 
then extend only to the property owners, Clifford and Essie « 
Wright. Since jurisdiction is predicated on the attached 
property, plaintiff must proceed against Clifford and Essie 
Wright only, the title owners of the property, to impose 
liability for the wrongful death action. If liability is 
established, then plaintiff could move against the attached 
property. As the matter now stands, however, defendant 
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James C. Wright has no interest in the property; and since 
the property is the basis of in rem jurisdiction, the Court 
has no jurisdiction over this defendant and the complaint 
in any event should be dismissed as against him. 
POINT III 
THE UTAH ATTACHMENT STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In her brief plaintiff asserts that Attachment 
statutes are not in conflict with constitutional guarantees. 
Attachment and garnishment statutes of various states have 
nevertheless been declared unconstitutional on the basis 
that they violate due process in failing to provide any pre-
attachment hearing. The Utah Attachment Statute suffers from 
the same infirmity. The cases invalidating the various attach-
ment statutes stemmed from the Supreme Court case of Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). In Fuentes the Supreme Court 
declared the replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylvania 
unconstitutional since they worked a deprivation of property 
without procedural due process of law insofar as they denied 
the right to a hearing before chattels were taken from their 
possessor. A pre-recovery hearing was constitutionally re-
quired in all cases except in certain 'extraordinary situa-
tions' which would justify postponing the needed hearing. In 
this regard the Court stated as follows: 
There are "extraordinary situations" that 
justify postponing notice and opportunity for 
a hearing. . . . These situations, however, must 
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be truly unusual. Only in a few limited situations 
has this Court allowed outright seizure without 
opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each 
case, the seizure has been directly necessary to 
secure an important government or general public 
interest. Second, there has been a special need 
for very prompt action. Third, the State has 
kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate 
force: the person initiating the seizure has been 
a government official responsible for determining, 
under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, 
that it was necessary and justified in a particular 
instance. Thus, the Court has allowed summary 
seizure of property to collect the internal revenue 
of the United States, to meet the needs of the 
national war effort, to protect against the economic 
disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the 
public from misbranded drugs and contaminated 
food. Fuentes v Shevin, supra at 90-92 
Finding that the Florida and Pennsylvania Statutes 
did not qualify under any of the exceptions listed above, the 
Court invalidated respective replevin statutes. It should bfe 
noted at this point, however, that the sole question before 
the Court was whether or not a pre-seizure hearing was re-
quired; under all circumstances a post-seizUre hearing was 
necessary to test the validity. Extraordinary circumstances 
may allow the postponement of the pre-seizure hearing, but 
no exception is allowed to a post-seizure hearing.' 
Following the decision in Fuentes, various state 
'statutes came under attack. In the following cases, the 
attachment statutes of the respective jurisdictions were de-
clared unconstitutional on the basis of the Fuentes case: 
Manning v. Palmer, 381 F. Supp. 713 (D. Ariz. 1974); Sugar 
v, Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (D. N.Y. 1974); 
-17-
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Roscoe v. Buller, 367 F. Supp. 574 (D. My. 1973); Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and. Breeding Ass'n., Inc., v PPG In-
dustries, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973); In re 
Northwest Homes, 363 F. Supp, 725 (D. Wash. 1973); Gunter v 
Merchant's Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973); 
Clement v Four North State Street Corp., 360 F. Supp. 933 
(D. N.H. 1973); McClellan v Commercial Credit Corp., 350 
F. Supp. 1013 (D. R.I. 1972). 
A discussion of two of the above cases is illustra-
tive of the rationale and holding of each. In Bay State 
Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Assn. v PPG Industries, 
Inc», 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973), the constitutionality 
of the Massachusetts attachment statute was put in question. 
In that case plaintiffs had attached the real estate of de-
fendants as security for a possible judgment to be obtained 
on a breach of contract action. No prior notice or hearing 
was given and none was provided in the Massachusetts attach-
ment statute. Defendants argued in that case that the attach-
ment of real estate v/as not a deprivation of property within 
the meaning of that phrase given in Fuentes, and even if it 
did, extraordinary circumstances were present which as de-
fined in Fuentes would eliminate the necessity of notice and 
hearing. The Court rejected both of these contentions and 
invalidated the attachment statute. With respect to the 
first argument, the Court stated: 
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•'/Viewing;'the attachment as a non-possessory 
lien. . .or as merely an encumbrance or cloud on 
the title. . .the interest created by the attach-
ment operates as a superior interest against sub-
sequent purchasers, mortgagees or attaching 
creditors, and thus restricts the owners ability 
to sell or mortgage the property at its full 
value. The determinative impact of the attach-
ment is that it deprives the owner of a property 
right or interest significant not only to him 
in his use of the property but to his use of 
the attaching party as well. 
• ' • • • . • 
We therefore conclude that the Massachusetts 
Attachment procedures applicable to real estate, 
when invoked, do effect deprivation of a signi-
ficant property interest of the owner without 
notice or opportunity to be heard. Bay State 
Harness, supra at 1304-06. 
With respect to the argument that extraordinary cir-
cumstances were present which would allow dispensing with 
prior notice and hearing, the court stated as follows: 
Neither the cases before us, nor the statutory 
scheme permitting the attachment, reveal any im-
portant or significant governmental or societal 
interest served by the statute. * . . Accordingly, 
the real estate attachment procedures. . . are 
facially constitutional defective under the due 
process of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as a 
result must fall. Bay State Harness, Supra at 
1306. 
In a second case, Gunter v. Merchantfs Warren Natfl. 
Bank, 360 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Me. 1973), the Maine attachment 
statute was under consideration. Defendants real estate had 
been seized without prior notice and hearing and that pro-
cedure was challenged. The Court rejected the same arguments 
-19-
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raised by the defendants in the Bfly State Harness case, (1) 
that the attachment of real estate did not constitute a 
taking of property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and (2) that extraordinary circumstances were present which 
dispense with the requirement of prior hearing and notice. 
With respect to the first argument the Court stated: 
A restriction on the power of a teal estate 
owner to alienate his property is such a depriva-
tion. A real estate attachment undei4 Maine law, 
while not disturbing possesion, creates a lien 
on the property. . .and effectively deprives the 
owner of his ability to convey a clear title 
while the attachment remains outstanding. . .As 
the record in the present case discloses, sub-
stantial hardship to the defendant may result * . . 
In light of the principles of due process enunci-
ated in Fuentes, it cannot be said that the right 
of an owner of real estate to alienate his pro-
\ perty is hot a "significant property interest" the 
deprivation of which is within the Fourteenth 
' Amendmend's protection. Gunter, v. Merchants 
Warren Nat!l. Bank, supra at 1090. ~~* ~~~ 
With respect to the second argument, the Court held 
that no extraordinary circumstances were present. 
The asserted public interest - the pro-
tection of creditors1 rights - is no differ-
ent in this case than it was in Sniadach 
and Fuentes. There will normally be no need 
for prompt action since the property in 
question is real estate, which cannot be re-
moved or destroyed, and the Maine Statutes 
are not narrowly drawn to meet any special 
situation in which the plaintiff could 
make a showing of immediate danger that a 
4
 defendant will alienate or otherwise en- *;'.. 
cumber his property. . . .Nor does any 
government official* exercise effective 
state control over the process, which is 
entirely within the power of the plaintiff 
and his attorney. 
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For the foregoing reasons, we hold 
that those provisions. . .of the Maine 
Rules of Civil Procedure which permit 
the prejudgment attachment of real estate 
without prior notice and hearing violate 
the Due Process of The Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and are hence void and unenforce-
able. 
Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l. Bank, supra at 
10^0-91. ~ 
In the above two cases, the attachment procedure 
was used as a means of securing a possible judgment. In a 
third case, the attachment procedure was used as a means of 
obtaining in rem jurisdiction where a personal jurisdiction 
was lacking. In that case, Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 
574 (D. My. 1973), the Court invalidated the Maryland attach-
ment statute which had been used as a vehicle to impose in 
rem jurisdiction. One question before the court was whether 
the use of the attachment statute as a means of acquiring 
in rem jurisdiction constituted an exception to the require-
ment for prior notice and hearing. In reviewing the "extra-
ordinary situations11 delineated in Fuentes, the court first 
held that attachment in aid of acquiring in rem jurisdiction 
constituted an important government or general public in-
terest and that a need for prompt action was needed thereby 
satisfying the second requirement, but held that Maryland 
did not maintain strict control over its monopoly of legiti-
mate force in issuing writs of attachment. No independent 
-71 -
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party reviewed the basic documents supporting the attachment; 
the attachment could be obtained ex parte, and no investi-
gation was made into the necessity of issuing an immediate 
writ of attachment. In the absence of this strict state 
control, the court held that the issuing of writs of attach-
ment under Maryland's Attachment Statute was purely minister-
ial and as such failed to satisfy the requirements of due 
process. 
The rationale of these cases is directly applicable 
to the Utah Attachment Statute, and the procedure followed 
in this case. No notice, nor prior hearing was provided be^ 
fore defendants' property was attached in Utah. The cases 
clearly hold that a substantial property interest is at 
stake in view of the lien and the cloud on the title which 
an attachment brings. Moreover, none of the extraordinary 
situations are satisfied in this case as required by Fuentes 
to dispense with prior notice and hearing. First, no appar-
ent direct governmental or general public interest is at 
stake. As noted in the statement of facts, all events lead-
ing up to this action took place in Colorado and the sole 
connection with the State of Utah is an undefined economic 
loss to the estate of Claude Rhoades. Colorado is the State 
which has the more substantial contact and the more substan-
tial government interest. Secondly, no special need for 
prompt action is needed. The cause of action in this case 
-22-
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arose in April, 1970; a transfer of interest as between 
the defendants was made in 1970 and no further change in 
title ownership has taken place from that time to the pre-
sent. This is so, in spite of a prior Federal Court case 
and the threatened filing of this case in Utah, and the 
filing of a third case in Colorado. Clearly, the case 
does not present an absconding debtor situation. Thirdly, 
with respect to the State's strict control over the person 
initiating the seizure, this procedure has been totally 
relegated to plaintiff's attorney. No one oversees the 
issuance of the writ of attachment; the allegations of the 
affidavit supporting the attachment are not challenged, and 
no hearing of any type is required. The sole State involve-
ment with the issuance of the attachment is the filing of 
the same after it is served by a constable. The failure to 
have notice and a prior hearing is therefore not justified 
under the extraordinary situations exception under Fuentes. 
The above discussion has centered on the question 
of whether a pre-judgment attachment without notice and 
hearing is unconstitutional when it lacks prior notice and 
hearing. Of significance in the instant case is the fact 
that the Utah Attachment Statute provides no post-attachment 
hearing where the legitimacy of the attachment can be tested. 
Under the decision in Fuentes the sole question was whether 
or not in certain exceptional circumstances the requirement 
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for a pre~attachm£nt hearing and notice could be waived. 
In any event, a post attachment hearing must be held to 
satisfy the requirements of Due Process. Under the Utah 
Attachment Statute, such a post-attachment hearing is not 
provided for, and constitutes the most fundamental consti-
tutional defect in the Statute. Defendants urge that 
the absence of any hearing or notice procedure are fatal 
defects rendering the Statute in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants urge that the decision below be affirmed. 
In the first place, the issue of jurisdiction has been fully 
litigated in the Federal courts and the decisions there con-
stitute res judicata. The subsequent change in the Utah 
Attachment Statute took place while the appeal from the fed-
eral district court was being pressed in the 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to bring 
this modification to the attention of the court and failed to 
do so. In view of their opportunity to alert the Court of 
this change, they are now precluded under principles of res 
judicata from making that argument in this court. Secondly, 
the Utah Attachment Statute is an improper vehicle to impose 
in rem jurisdiction in a wrongful death case where the tort 
sued on arose in Colorado. No state interests are satisfied 
by sustaining jurisdiction in this state and the imposition 
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of such jurisdiction would be contrary to the basic philosophy 
surrounding the act. If jurisdiction is upheld, it should 
then extend only to Clifford and Essie Wright, and not to 
James Clifford Wright who is not an owner of the property. 
Thirdly, the Utah Attachment Statute is unconstitutional in 
view of its failure to provide the pre-seizure of a post-
seizure hearing. For these reasons, defendants respectfully 
urge that this court sustain the decision entered by Judge 
Edward Sheya below. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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